



# UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
United States Patent and Trademark Office  
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450  
www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/003,608	11/01/2001	Gabor T. Bartha	IN-0040 US	5161
22434	7590	03/01/2004	EXAMINER	
BEYER WEAVER & THOMAS LLP			SMITH, CAROLYN L	
P.O. BOX 778			ART UNIT	
BERKELEY, CA 94704-0778			PAPER NUMBER	

1631

DATE MAILED: 03/01/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

<b>Office Action Summary</b>	<b>Application No.</b> 10/003,608	<b>Applicant(s)</b> BARTHA ET AL.	
	<b>Examiner</b> Carolyn L Smith	<b>Art Unit</b> 1631	

**-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --**

**Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**Status**

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 08 December 2003.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**.                      2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-4 and 7-14 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-4 and 7-14 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All    b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

**Attachment(s)**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)   | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)                                   | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)             |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____  |

### DETAILED ACTION

Applicant's amendments and remarks, filed 12/8/03, are acknowledged. Amended claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 are acknowledged.

Applicant's arguments, filed 12/8/03, have been fully considered but they are not deemed to be persuasive. Rejections and/or objections not reiterated from the previous office actions are hereby withdrawn. The following rejections and/or objections are either reiterated or newly applied. They constitute the complete set presently being applied to the instant application.

Claims 1-4 and 7-14 are herein under examination.

#### *Double Patenting*

A rejection based on double patenting of the "same invention" type finds its support in the language of 35 U.S.C. 101 which states that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor ..." (Emphasis added). Thus, the term "same invention," in this context, means an invention drawn to identical subject matter. See *Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.*, 151 U.S. 186 (1894); *In re Ockert*, 245 F.2d 467, 114 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1957); and *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970).

A statutory type (35 U.S.C. 101) double patenting rejection can be overcome by canceling or amending the conflicting claims so they are no longer coextensive in scope. The filing of a terminal disclaimer cannot overcome a double patenting rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. 101.

The provisional rejection of claims 1-4 and 7-14 is maintained under 35 U.S.C. 101 as claiming the same invention as that of claims 1-4 and 11-18 of copending Application No. 10/235994. This is a provisional double patenting rejection since the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

Applicants propose to amend or cancel the noted claims in the cited application to address this rejection if the issue is not resolved prior to the conclusion of this prosecution or the issuance of a patent on that application. While this proposal is acknowledged, the rejection is maintained.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101***

35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

The rejection of claims 7-14 is maintained under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. As written, the claims appear to lack any physical result performed outside of a computer.

This rejection is maintained and reiterated for reasons of record.

As stated in MPEP § 2106, (IV)(B)(2)(b), to be statutory, a claimed computer-related process must either: (A) result in a physical transformation outside the computer for which a practical application in the technological arts is either disclosed in the specification or would have been known to a skilled artisan (discussed in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(i)), or (B) be limited to a practical application within the technological arts (discussed in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii)).

As stated in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(i), the independent physical acts may be post- or pre-computer processing activity as described below:

A process is statutory if it requires physical acts to be performed outside the computer independent of and following the steps to be performed by a programmed computer, where those acts involve the manipulation of tangible physical objects and result in the

Art Unit: 1631

object having a different physical attribute or structure. *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. at 187, 209 USPQ at 8. Thus, if a process claim includes one or more post-computer process steps that result in a physical transformation outside the computer (beyond merely conveying the direct result of the computer operation), the claim is clearly statutory.

Another statutory process is one that requires the measurements of physical objects or activities to be transformed outside of the computer into computer data (In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 41 n.7, 201 USPQ 136, 145 n.7 (CCPA 1979) (data-gathering step did not measure physical phenomenon); *Arrhythmia*, 958 F.2d at 1056, 22 USPQ2d at 1036), where the data comprises signals corresponding to physical objects or activities external to the computer system, and where the process causes a physical transformation of the signals which are intangible representations of the physical objects or activities. *Schrader*, 22 F.3d at 294, 30 USPQ2d at 1459 citing with approval *Arrhythmia*, 958 F.2d at 1058-59, 22 USPQ2d at 1037-38; *Abele*, 684 F.2d at 909, 214 USPQ at 688; In re *Taner*, 681 F.2d 787, 790, 214 USPQ 678, 681 (CCPA 1982).

As stated in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii), the computer-related process may be limited to a practical application in the technological arts as described below:

There is always some form of physical transformation within a computer because a computer acts on signals and transforms them during its operation and changes the state of its components during the execution of a process. Even though such a physical transformation occurs within a computer, such activity is not determinative of whether the process is statutory because such transformation alone does not distinguish a statutory computer process from a nonstatutory computer process. What is determinative is not how the computer performs the process, but what the computer does to achieve a practical application. See *Arrhythmia*, 958 F.2d at 1057, 22 USPQ2d at 1036.

Claims 7-14 do not fulfill either of these statutory requirements and are therefore rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claim is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

The rejection of claims 7-14 is also maintained under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to the non-statutory subject matter of merely performing mathematical computations.

This rejection is maintained and reiterated for reasons of record.

MPEP § 2106, (IV)(1) states the following:

If the “acts” of a claimed process manipulate only numbers, abstract concepts or ideas, or signals representing any of the foregoing, the acts are not being applied to appropriate subject matter. Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294-95, 30 USPQ2d at 1458-59. Thus, a process consisting solely of mathematical operations, i.e., converting one set of numbers into another set of numbers, does not manipulate appropriate subject matter and thus cannot constitute a statutory process.

In practical terms, claims define nonstatutory processes if they:

- consist solely of mathematical operations without some claimed practical application (i.e., executing a “mathematical algorithm”); or
- simply manipulate abstract ideas, e.g., a bid (Schrader, 22 F.3d at 293-94, 30 USPQ2d at 1458-59) or a bubble hierarchy (Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1360, 31 USPQ2d at 1759), without some claimed practical application.

MPEP § 2106, (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii) states the following:

A process that merely manipulates an abstract idea or performs a purely mathematical algorithm is non-statutory despite the fact that it might inherently have some usefulness.

Applicants state claim 7 is directed to a computer program product comprising a machine readable medium and claim 11 is directed to a computing device comprising a memory device to store a program. These statements are acknowledged; however, placing a non-statutory process (in this case, in the form of program code) on a machine readable medium or memory device, does not overcome the non-statutory subject matter since neither of the safe harbors listed above (MPEP § 2106, (IV)(B)(2)(b)) are present in claims 7 and 11. For claim 7, Applicants cite (MPEP 2106 IV.B.1.a.) inferring “the computer program’s functionality to be realized”. This is found unpersuasive as no functionality is addressed for the computer program. The MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(1)(b) states:

Art Unit: 1631

Where certain types of descriptive material, such as [...] mere arrangements or compilations of facts or data, are merely stored so as to be read or outputted by a computer without creating any functional interrelationship, either as part of the stored data or as part of the computing processes performed by the computer, then such descriptive material alone does not impart functionality either to the data as so structured, or to the computer.

Applicants further state that claim 11 is directed to a practical application (MPEP § 2106

IV.B.2.b.ii). This is found unpersuasive a practical application does not appear to be accomplished in the claim. Regarding practical application, the MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii) states the following example:

A computer process that simply calculates a mathematical algorithm that models noise is nonstatutory. However, a claimed process for digitally filtering noise employing the mathematical algorithm is statutory.

Comparing the above scenario to claims 7 and 11, the claimed codes that merely receive images, analyze images, and compare patterns to identify subsets of genes are comparable to the nonstatutory example given above as they do not appear to have a valid practical application applied to the subsets of genes.

### ***Conclusion***

No claim is allowed.

**THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period

will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Papers related to this application may be submitted to Technical Center 1600 by facsimile transmission. Papers should be faxed to Technical Center 1600 via the PTO Fax Center located in Crystal Mall 1. The faxing of such papers must conform with the notices published in the Official Gazette, 1096 OG 30 (November 15, 1988), 1156 OG 61 (November 16, 1993), and 1157 OG 94 (December 28, 1993) (See 37 CFR §1.6(d)). The CM1 Fax Center number is (703) 872-9306.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Carolyn Smith, whose telephone number is (571) 272-0721. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Thursday from 8 A.M. to 6:30 P.M.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Michael Woodward, can be reached on (571) 272-0722.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application should be directed to Legal Instruments Examiner Tina Plunkett whose telephone number is (571) 272-0549 or to the Technical Center receptionist whose telephone number is (703) 308-0196.

February 25, 2004

  
ARDIN H. MARSCHEL  
PRIMARY EXAMINER